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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BLAINE L. PETTINGILL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RAY B. PERKINS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F:ACTS. 
Case No. 
8077 
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict of the Jury and 
the judgment entered thereon in favor of the defendant, 
no cause of action. 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages 
for the death of his infant son, Keith W. Pettingill, who 
was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant in 
front of the Pettingill home in Clearfield, Utah on the 
22nd of July, 1952. The child was of the age of two years. 
The plaintiff contends that the verdict of the Jury 
and the judgment entered thereon are not supported by 
the evidence and are contrary to the evidence. It is, 
therefore, necessary to review the evidence. 
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Billie Mae Harris testified that she is a sister of 
Mrs. Pettingill and together they were sitting on the 
lawn in front of the Pettingill home at the time of the 
accident (Tr. 4). Keith had crossed the road to play with 
his two brothers and a boy by the name of R.oland Rich. 
The deceased, in his play, was filling a bucket \vith sand 
(Tr. 5). The child had been sitting on the lawn playing 
in the sand that lies immediately west of and next to the 
lawn. There was approximately seven or eight feet of 
sand between the hard-surface portion of the road and 
the lawn and the child was playing where the sand meets 
the lawn. Three other children were playing with him. 
They were Blaine Clark, 4 years of age, Dennis Clark, 6 
years of age, and R-oland Rich, who was standing with 
his bicycle ( Tr. 6). The witness, Mrs. Harris, was feed-
ing her baby and glanced up just in time to see the child 
struck. At that time the child was three feet out into the 
road from the east edge of the hard surface, when the 
car struck him at the right front fender. Keith rolled 
under the car. The witness yelled at the defendant, but 
the car didn't stop until it had gone eighty-five feet. The 
child was picked up two feet behind the rear wheel of 
the defendant's automobile. When the car stopped, the 
defendant got out and said, "What have I done" (Tr. 7). 
Prior to the collision the witness heard no horn sound. 
The car appeared to go directly north and did not swerve. 
The home is not located in the business section and the 
only cars that pass in front of the ho1ne are those belong-
ing to people living in the area (Tr. 8). The witness was 
shown plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B", which, she testi-
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fied, correctly show the street, as of the time of the acci-
dent. The Rich home, in front of which the children were 
playing in the sand, is directly across the road from the 
Pettingill lawn ( Tr. 9). Looking north from the corner 
of Center Street along Third North one can see three and 
a half blocks and at that time there was no obstruction 
to vision on the highway for the whole distance (Tr. 10). 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Harris testified that she 
and Mrs. Pettingill had been sitting in front of the Pet-
tingill home on the lawn approximately an hour before 
the accident occurred and that the child, Keith, had just 
gone over across the street for the first time shortly be-
fore the accident. Prior to that time he had been playing 
in the sand on the west side of the road, the side on which 
the Pettingill horne is located ( Tr. 11). The mother of 
the child knew that the child had crossed the street. The 
mother of the child was sitting on the lawn, facing the 
west, with her back to the street (Tr. 12). The child was 
sitting in the sand immediately next to the lawn and 
seven or eight feet east from the edge of the hard-
surface portion of the road (Tr. 12-13). Very few auto-
mobiles pass the Pettingill residence. Probably one every 
thirty minutes (Tr. 13). The accident happened about 
.. six o'clock. The road is used oftener than one car every 
half hour. The point of impact was approximately three 
feet west of the east edge of the hard surfaced part- of 
the road. The witness had no opinion as to the speed the 
defendant was traveling and that it could possibly be 
ten miles per hour. The car was going slowly and left no 
brake or skid marks ( Tr. 15). Mrs. Pettingill had her 
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back to the road and couldn't have seen the child struck 
(Tr. 16). Witness couldn't tell whether the child was 
running or walking. He was carrying a bucket full of 
sand in his little hand (Tr. 17). The witness stated that 
at the time of the accident she gave a statement that the 
baby jumped up and ran across the road and was hit 
by the coming car and that the man did not know that he 
had hit the boy, but that she couldn't say whether or not 
he was running because she didn't know (Tr. 18). That 
at the time of the accident the child was going directly 
west (Tr. 19). The street in front of the Pettingill home, 
300 East Street, is a two-lane road (Tr. 20). When the 
witness saw Keith before the accident the child was not 
in the traveled portion of the road but was seven or eight 
feet east of the edge of the road next to the lawn. A few 
seconds later the witness looked up and saw the child 
walking toward her and the car hit him. She observed 
the child just before the car struck him, but she had not 
observed the car prior to that time (Tr. 21). On re-
direct examination the witness testified that plaintiff's 
Exhibit "B" shows the children on the edge of the high-
way in the same positions that they were in at the time 
the accident happ·ened and that the same is true of plain-
tiff's Exhibit "A" (Tr. 22). There were no cars parked 
on tlie east side of the highway in the whole block. There 
were no weeds or shrubs growing out in the highway. 
Looking north fron1 the corner of ·Center Street you could 
see the children from that point (Tr. 23). The child 
standing in the street in Exhibit "B" is standing where 
the deceased was struck at the tilne of the accident (Tr. 
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24). On re-cross examination the witness te-stified that 
the child was not moving in a crouched position (Tr. 26). 
Dennis Pettingill was then sworn and testified on 
behalf of the plaintiff. The witness was seven years old. 
Roland Rich is seven years old and was standing by his 
bicycle. The Inother told the witness to watch Keith and 
thereupon the witness went across the street to where 
the child was playing (Tr. 28). The witness did not see 
Keith get hit. All he saw was when Keith got half way 
out in the middle of the road he saw him tumble under-
neath the car. He was rolled underneath the car (Tr. 29). 
Tlie witness went across the street with Keith. Keith re-
turned with some sand in a bucket and dumped it and 
then went back across the street again (Tr. 30). The 
mother told the witness he could go across the street to 
play and told Keith he could go also (Tr. 31). 
Eunice Rich was then sworn and testified for the 
plaintiff. The witness was a nurse and neighbor, living 
directly across the street from the Pettingills. At the 
time of the accident she was standing in her driveway, 
facing in a northerly direction, talking to a Mrs. Chard, 
who was sitting in an automobile in the driveway of the 
Rich home (Tr. 32). The witness heard an impact and 
screaming. She thereupon turned around and saw an 
object rolling under the car which she thought was a 
dog, but when she looked again she saw the dog running 
behind the car, so she knew the object under the car must 
be a child (Tr. 33). The street in front of her home is 
300 East Street and isn't highly traveled (Tr. 36). 
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Mrs. Irene Pettingill testified that the deceased was 
twenty-six months old at the time of his death (Tr. 40). 
The little boy shown standing in Exhibits "A" and "B" 
was placed where Keith was at the time he was hit 
( Tr. 43). Exhibits "A" and "B" were offered and re-
ceived. At the corner of Center Street on 300 East there 
was a traffic sign showing the picture of a child playing 
on it with the figures ten miles an hour. The witness had 
her back kind of turned to the road, but was turned so 
that she could keep the children in sight. When Keith 
wanted to go across the street and play with the children 
over there the witness felt there was no harm in it and 
let him go. She watched hin1 cross the street and told 
her son Dennis to keep an eye on his brother, and the 
last she remembers he was sitting on the lawn filling 
his bucket with sand. She had just turned from looking 
at the children when she heard her sister yell. She looked 
up and the child was rolling under the car (Tr. 44). She 
jumped up· and ran after the car and yelled at the driver. 
After the car stopped the driver got out and asked what 
he had done, and the witness told him he had run over 
her baby and killed him. The child was then taken to the 
house and Mrs. Rich called a doctor and an ambulance 
and the child was taken to the hospital, where he died a 
couple of hours later (Tr. 45). The witness identified 
Exhibit "C" as a picture of the deceased taken about 
ten days before the child was killed (Tr. 46). 
On cross examination Mrs. Pettingill testified that 
she was seated on her lawn with her back to the road and 
that ~she could look and see Keith from that position. 
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She did not see the car coming before the accident 
occurred (Tr. 47). The baby had been on the opposite 
side of the road just a few minutes before the accident 
occurred, probably fifteen minutes (Tr. 48). When the 
baby crossed the street he did so alone and she did not 
feel it was dangerous to allow the child to cross the street 
alone when there was no car in sight. He had walked 
across the street a dozen times. The witness felt that it 
was dangerous for the child to walk across the street if 
she was not there. She had cautioned him about not going 
across the street and had asked Dennis to watch him. 
The last time she saw Keith sitting on the lawn or on the 
edge of the grass she felt he was in a safe position 
(Tr. 50). Exhibits "A" and "B" were taken about the 
same time of day that the baby was struck. They were 
taken about three weeks after the accident ( Tr. 54). 
On re-direct examination the witness testified that 
the distance between their home and Center Street had 
been stepped off and it was about 375 feet. 
George Williams, father of Mrs. Pettingill, was then 
sworn and testified that at the scene of the accident the 
officer asked the defendant at what speed he was driv-
ing and he said about twenty miles an hour, whereupon 
a little hoy came up from the corner and said that the 
speed limit was ten miles an hour, and the defendant 
said that he must have been traveling at about that speed 
(Tr. 58, 59). He and the officer measured the distance 
from where the bucket of sand had been to the place 
where the car stopped and it was 85 feet (Tr. 60). A day 
or two later he examined the defendant's automobile and 
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there ·was a dent in the right front fender just above the 
bumper where the boy's head had hit, the bumper had 
blood on it, and there was a little hair around the dent 
in the fender. The dent was about the size of a man's 
head. The defendant told the witness that the dent 
wasn't there the day before (Tr. 61). The sand which 
apparently came from the bucket the child was carrying 
was in the road at approximately the place where the 
boy was standing in Exhibit "B". 
The plaintiff testified that the deceased was his son. 
On the day of the accident he was working at the Ogden 
Arsenal and returned home at about 4:15 (Tr. 65). He 
thereafter left and went to Arsenal Villa to do some 
television repair work. He was adjusting an antenna on 
a roof when Mr. Clark, a neighbor, drove up and said 
his boy had had an accident. He immediately went to 
the home and then to the hospital (Tr. 66). At the 
hospital they told him the boy was dead (Tr. 67). Streets 
running west from 300 North dead-end in 300 North. 
There is very little traffic on 300 East and there are no 
sidewalks on the street. People going to church and 
school have to walk down the 1niddle of the street, which 
is the common practice (Tr. 68). He saw the defendant's 
automobile the day after the funeral. It was well kept 
and the only dent in the fender was the dent where the 
baby was hit. In the grill the baby's hand went in and 
left some skin ( Tr. 71). 
The plaintiff rested. 
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The first witness called for the defendant was Rich-
ard L. Padgett. He stated that on the 22nd day of July, 
1952 he was working part time in the Clearfield Police 
Station and one of his duties was to investigate automo-
bile accidents. He heard about the accident involved in 
this case at 6:30 (Tr. 74). It was daylight when he arrived 
at the scene of the accident. He observed no skid marks 
on the pavement. The width of 300 East Street would 
be close to 18 or 20 feet ( Tr. 75). The street had a hard 
surface, oiled surface, with shoulders of sand. The 
shoulders were approximately two feet in width, meas-
ured from the edge of the road to the crest. The defend-
ant said he had been traveling ten miles an hour (Tr. 
76). Mrs. Billie Mae Harris stated that the boy ran 
across the street in front of the car and that the boy was 
kind of leaning forward and running. Mrs. Harris 
showed the witness where the child was struck. From 
that point he measured to a point where he was shown 
that the boy came to a stop. The measurement was 
seventy-five feet ( Tr. 77). The witness testified that he 
was acquainted with the area where the accident occurred 
and the street is not traveled extensively or heavily (Tr. 
80). Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B" are the approxi-
mate picture of the conditions at the time the accident 
happened. The witness knew nothing of the individual~. 
or automobiles shown in the picture (Tr. 82). 
Mrs. Lorraine N. Perkins, wife of defendant, was 
then called. She testified that she was riding in the front 
seat of the car with her husband when the accident 
occurred. There were five children in the car, four in 
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the back seat and one in the front. The child in front 
was a baby sitting on her lap. They entered 300 East 
Street at Center Street. Her husband stopped before 
entering 300 East Street at Center Street (Tr. 84). He 
slowed down to turn the corner and then proceeded north 
on Third East Street. The witness didn't see any chil-
dren in the road as the car proceeded north. She stated 
that she did not see a child at any time before the acci-
dent occurred. She heard the impact but did not know 
what it was at the time. As soon as her husband hit 
the child he put on his brakes and stopped immediately. 
Her husband was driving at ten miles an hour (Tr. 85). 
Some of the windows in the car were up and some were 
down. As the car turned from Center Street into Third 
East Street she looked down the street and didn't see any 
children in the street, nor did she see a bicycle. The wit-
ness was shown plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and stated she 
remembered the same as being 300 East Street (Tr. 87). 
The little boy shown in Exhibit "A" was pointed out to 
the witness. She stated that she could see him in the 
picture but didn't see him that day. There were no 
children on that day that she could see. She didn't see 
any children at any time that day. She didn't see the 
little boy that got hit. She knew that her husband was 
not going over ten miles an hour because he just turned 
the corner, shifting from first gear to second gear. She 
did not look at the sp·eedometer, but she knew that the 
defendant was not going over ten miles an hour. He 
couldn't have been going over twelve miles an hour. He 
couldn't have been going more than ten miles an hour 
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(Tr. 88). She was asked whether her husband was going 
eight 1niles. an hour and she stated 1naybe. She was asked 
if he was going five miles an hour and she said he 
wasn't going five miles an hour. She was asked if he 
was going three miles an hour and she answered "No." 
She was asked if he was going eleven and she answered 
"No." She was asked if he was going exactly ten and 
she answered "Yes." There ·were no cars parked between 
the place of the a.cciden t and Center Street. She did not 
hear the bump (Tr. 89). She heard something at the 
back end which the car ran over and thought it was a dog 
or something. Their car was not damaged before the 
accident but was afterwards. The right front fender was 
dented in about as big as a baby's head (Tr. 90). 
The defendant, Ray B. Perkins, was then sworn 
and testified. At the time of the accident he was driving 
a 1935 Chevrolet four-door automobile (Tr. 95). He was 
headed north on Third East when the accident occurred. 
Just before. he entered Third East he had been driving 
on Center Street (Tr. 96). He went a little past Third 
East and had to back up and make the turn into Third 
East. It was daytime and the sun was shining. As he 
proceeded north on Third East he did not observe any 
children on the street nor near the street. The first that 
he knew that anything was wrong was when his back 
wheels went over something. He did not know what it 
was but he stopped his automobile and got out and 
looked (Tr. 97). He stopped his automobile by putting 
on the brakes in the usual manner. When he got out Mrs. 
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Pettingill had the child in her arms. He asked what he 
had done and she answered "You killed my child." As he 
was driving up Third East Street he was looking straight 
ahead, watching the road, at a rate of speed of ten miles 
an hour, in second gear (Tr. 98). As he turned into Third 
East from Center Street ~e could see three blocks ahead. 
There was no obstruction in the street. The weather was 
clear ( Tr. 91). There were no cars between the corner 
of Center Street and where the collision occurred. There 
were no cars parked on either side of the highway and 
there were no cars coming on the highway or traveling 
either way other than his automobile. He was shown 
Exhibit "A" and stated that he could see the road as well 
as it is shown in the picture and that Exhibit "A" and 
Exhibit "B" are a fair view of what he could see, except 
that there was nothing on the road at the time of the 
accident ( Tr. 100). He did not see any children off to 
the side where the bicycle is in the picture. The windows 
in the car were down. He did not hear the collision 
between the automobile and the child (Tr. 101). He did 
not hear anyone scream or any noise outside. He did 
not tell the officer that he was going between fifteen and 
twenty miles an hour. He testified that he told the police 
officer he was going ten miles an hour (Tr. 102). He was 
asked if he recalled a boy saying something about the 
speed limit sign which shows ten miles an hour. He 
answered that he remembered that the boy said that ten 
miles an hour was the speed limit (Tr. 103). 
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that the 
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street had been reoiled since the accident but was 
approximately the sa1ne width as at the time of the acci-
dent. The rosebush shown in defendant's Exhibit 2 could 
have been there on the day of the accident. Exhibit 2 
was then offered and received. 
~Ir. S-. S. Taylor was then sworn and testified for 
the defendant. He stated that he was a professional engi-
neer, e1nployed by the Salt Lake City Traffic Engineer-
ing Staff (Tr. 105). The witness then testified as to his 
experience (Tr. 106). Third East Street is _an oiled 
street and is approximately eighteen feet in width. In 
some places it narrows to sixteen feet and in other places 
it widens to twenty feet. The outside width shoulder to 
shoulder is twenty-nine to thirty feet in width (Tr. 109). 
The west edge of a bush identified by the witness was 
just a little east of a utility pole. The bush was identified 
as the bush shown in defendant's Exhibit 2 (Tr. 112). 
The witness was asked if there was a possibility that the 
bush shown in the photograph could prevent a motorist 
from seeing an object on the west edge of the lawn in 
front of the Rich home, to which the witness gave the 
answer "On the west edge of the lawn~" To which the 
question was then asked "To where you saw it later" 
and the answer was "Yes." (Tr. 113). The witness was 
then asked the following question: "Based on your 
experience and training, is it possible that a person driv-' 
ing north on Third East in Clearfield after driving in 
the sunlight and assume further that an object is situated 
or located on your diagram, directly across from the 
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Pettingill residence, on the west edge of the Rich home 
in the shade, and, assume that the motorist has nor1nal 
vision; I will ask you if it is a possibility that the shade 
might camouflage or to some extent hide the presence of 
that object~" Answer, "I think it might" (Tr. 114). The 
rosebush mentioned by the witness is east of the pole 
shown in the photograph. The west edge of the bush is 
east of the pole shown in Exhibit "B" (Tr. 121). The pole 
is about twelve feet from the edge of the lawn (Tr. 125). 
The Jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, 
and found in answer to two special interrogatories: (1) 
That the mother of Keith Pettingill was guilty of con-
tributory negligence which proximately contributed to 
the accident and resulting death of the child and (2) That 
the defendant was operating his automobile at the rate 
of ten miles per hour. 
The evidence conclusively shows that the defendant 
was negligent. The child was too young to be capable 
of being contributorily negligent and the Court so in-
structed the Jury. Therefore, the only ground upon 
which the Jury could have found in favor of the defend-
ant was the contributory negligence of the mother of the 
deceased. The ap·pellant confesses that appellant's coun-
sel requested an instruction to the effect that the contrib-
utory negligence of the parents or either of them would 
bar recovery. The Court instructed that the father was 
not negligent but that the contributory negligence of the 
mother would bar the action. This is not the law. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The appellant will present his case under five 
points: 
( 1) There was no evidence that the Inother of the 
deceased was negligent. 
(2) The negligence of the mother, if any, was 
im1na terial. 
(3) The defendant had the last clear chance to 
a void the accident. 
( 4) The negligence of the defendant was the sole, 
proximate cause of the accident and the resulting death 
of the child. 
( 5) The evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
verdict of the Jury and the judgment entered thereon, 
and said verdict and judgment are not supported by the 




THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MOTHER OF 
THE DECEASED WAS NEGLIGENT. 
It must be remembered that 300 East Street was not 
a much traveled road and the speed limit thereon was 
ten miles an hour. The child was permitted to cross the 
road while the mother and her sister were sitting on the 
lawn directly across froin the child. The child was in 
company with three other children and the seven-year 
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old 'SOn was instructed to care for the child. A moment 
or two before the accident occurred the mother was 
watching the cliild and saw it sitting on the edge of the 
lawn seven or eight feet east of the hard surfaced por-
tion of the highway and ten feet east of the point of 
collision. The children, including the deceased, were in 
clear, unobstructed view of any motorist who might be 
transversing the highway. Under such circumstances it 
was not negligence for the mother to permit the child 
to be across the road from where she was sitting. 
In the case of Barker v. Savas, 172 Pac. 672, 52 Utah 
262, a child of six years of age was killed while riding 
a tricycle along R.edwood Road, one of the much travelled 
highways of Salt Lake County. The defendant com-
plained that the Court refused to instruct the Jury upon 
the question of the contributory negligence of the child 
and of his parents, because the defendant had not 
pleaded contributory negligence. The Court reviewed 
the evidence and stated that the father could not have 
been guilty of contributory negligence and said concern-
ing the negligence of the mother that she permitted the 
boy to follow other boys with a pony down Redwood Road 
to the cemetery and that she carefully watched him to 
that point and saw him turn and start for home. The 
Court said: 
"Certainly there is not a scintilla of evidence 
in the record that any negligence of the plaintiff 
(the father) contributed to the injury complained 
of. Neither was there any negligence on the part 
of the mother. If the jury in this case had ren-
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dered a special verdict and found against the 
plaintiff on the grounds of contributory negli-
gence of any of the parties concerned and the 
question was presented to this Court for review, 
we would feel it our duty to reverse the cause on 
that ground alone." 
A co1nparison of these two cases will disclose that 
there was more ground for finding negligence of the 
mother in Barker vs. Sa,vas than in the case at bar. 
POINT TWO 
THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, OF THE 
MOTHER WAS IMMATERIAL. 
The law is that the contributory negligence of the 
mother in an action brought by the father for the death 
of their child is irrunaterial. The law on the question of 
the contributory negligence of a beneficiary in an action 
brought under the wrongful death statutes is discussed 
in several A.L.R. annotations. The most recent and 
exhaustive discussion of this matter is found in 2 A.L.R. 
2d Series commencing at page 785. The law involving the 
contributory negligence of one spouse in an action 
brought by the other spouse for the wrongful death of a 
child is discussed at page 805 of 2 A.L.R. 2d Series. 
There the annotator says: 
"Attention is called also to the fact that by 
the great weight of modern authority the negli-
gence of one spouse is not imputed to the other 
unless he or she is the agent of the other in the 
matter at hand or they are jointly engaged in the 
prosecution of a common enterprise. See 38 Am. 
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~ ur. 925, 926, Negligence, Section 239. From this 
It follows that in an action against the third per-
son for the death of a child the contributory negli-
gence of one of the parents will not be imputable 
to the other, so as to preclude recovery for or on 
behalf of the parent who was not negligent merely 
because of their relation as husband and wife and 
absent any partnership, joint undertaking or com-
munity of interest." 
The jurisdictions which hold that the contributory 
negligence of the mother is a bar to an action by the 
father do so upon the basis that one spouse is the agent 
of the other spouse in the ca.re of the children or, as in the 
community property states, any recovery would in effect 
be for the benefit of the negligent spouse. This Court has 
repudiated the doctrine of agency existing between par-
ents simply because of the marriage relationship. In the 
case of Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 Pac. (2d) 437, 113 Utah 
276, the defendant argued that since Mrs. Conklin was 
taking her child to a music lesson she was acting as agent 
for the husband in the care and education of the child, 
and, therefore, her negligence should be imputed to Dr. 
Conklin. This Court held, following Fox vs. Lavendar, 
89 Utah 115, 56 Pac. (2) 1049, that there was no agency 
relationship between Mrs. Conklin and Dr. Conklin in 
the care of the child and the negligence of Mrs. Conklin 
was not imputable to Dr. Conklin. 
In the case of Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad 
Compa111J vs. Umbaugh, 123 (2d) 224, 61 Nev. 214, the 
Court discussed the question at length and therein states, 
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quoting with approval from McDonald vs. O'Reilly (45 
Or. 589, 78 Pac. 753, 754) as follows: 
"But the contributory negligence which will 
bar recovery must be that of the person from 
whon1 the cause of action is derived or the bene-
ficiary, or son1eone standing in such relation to 
the beneficiary that the maximum 'qui facit per 
aliu1n· facit per se' may be invoked. A wife does 
not from the mere marital relation, however, 
occupy such a position in the care and custody of 
a minor child. Under our statute, the right and 
responsibility of the parents in that regard are 
equal, and the 1nother is as fully entitled to the 
custody and care of the children as the father. 
* * * The doctrine to be found in some of the 
books, therefore, that because the father is the 
legal custodian of the children, or because of the 
identity of the parents, the law will assume that 
the mother is the agent of the father, for whose 
negligence he is responsible, can have no applica-
tion. A mother is not the agent of the father in 
the care of the children, any more than the father 
is the agent of the mother. They are both equal 
before the law. The common interest or common 
duty of the parents toward the children will not 
of itself make one the agent of the other or re-
sponsible for that other's negligence. Such seems 
to be the result of the decided cases in cases where 
the doctrine of imputed negligence is not recog-
nized." 
The following cases are in point: Lakeview Inc. vs. 
Davidson, 26 Pac. (2d) 760, 166 Okla. 171; Phillip-s vs. 
Denver City Tramway Company, 128 Pac. 460, 53 Colo. 
458; Herrell vs. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Com-
pany, 23 S.W. (2d) 102, 324 Mo. 38, 69 A.L.R. 470. 
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POINT THREE 
THE DEFENDANT HAD THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
TO AVOID THE A!CCIDENT. 
The evidence is conclusive that the defendant had a 
clear, unobstructed view of the children from the time 
he left Center Street to the point of the collision, a dis-
tance of 375 feet. Appellant respectfully requests the 
Court to carefully examine plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and 
"B". Defendant and his wife both testified that they were 
travelling ten miles an hour. The Jury, in answer to a 
special interrogatory, found the fact to be so. At such 
speed he had a clear, unobstructed view of the children 
for more than twenty-five seconds. He said he did not 
see the ·children. It was his duty to keep a constant look-
out in operating his automobile and particularly in view 
of the fact that the traffic sign which he had just passed 
indicated that children would probably be playing along 
the street and the speed limit was ten miles per hour. It 
being his duty to see the children, he is considered in law 
to have seen the children. As was stated in Palmer vs. 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 34 Utah 423, 98 
Pac. 689, 700: 
"If a duty is cast upon one to loo~, then in 
contemplation of law, he also sees, whether in fact 
he does so or not. What one ought to see, he as a 
matter of law does see." 
On the same page the Court said: 
"Under such circumstances, however, the 
ability to see was, in the eye of the law, tanta-
mount to seeing. The negligence, in such event, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
would consist in not seeing what ought to have 
been seen, and the fact whether he saw or not, 
would not be controlling-in fact not even essen-
tial." 
As the Court said in Richards vs. Palace LaU<ndry 
Company, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439: 
"This Court is firrnly comrnitted to the rule 
just stated, narnely, that in case there is a duty 
owing to the plaintiff to maintain a lookout, then, 
if the person charged with causing the injury in 
the exercise of ordinary care and vigilance could 
have discovered the p·erilous situation of the com-
plainant in time to have averted injuring him, the 
law presumes that the person charged with negli-
gence saw what he ought to have seen and actual 
discovery is not necessary." 
Concerning the duty of one driving an automobile 
under such circumstances the Court in Barker vs. Savas, 
Supra, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672, said, referring to the 
defendant: 
"He was behind the deceased with nothing 
to obscure or obstruct his vision. If he had looked 
ahead, as was his duty to do, there was nothing 
to prevent his seeing the deceased in time to avoid 
the collision. That it was his duty to look ahead 
in the exercise of reasonable care, in cases of this 
kind, is so generally recognized as a legal duty as 
to be beyond all controversy. Indeed, the doctrine 
is elementary." 
It is very difficult to believe the defendant and his 
wife when they testified that they did not see the chil-
dren. The willingness of the defendants to testify to 
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such fact is characterized by the testilnony of the wife 
of the defendant that although she did not look at the 
speedometer, she was certain that the automobile was 
not going over ten miles an hour. She was asked if the 
defendant was going eleven miles an hour and she 
answered no. She was asked if he was going exactly ten 
miles and she answered yes. 
Mrs. Eunice Rich, who was standing in the driveway 
of her home some distance from the point of collision,-
heard the impact and heard the screams of Mrs. Pettingi~l 
and Mrs. Harris, who were on the opposite side of the 
street from her. The defendant's automobile was between 
Mrs. Rich and the other two women. Yet the defendant 
testified that he did not hear the impact and did not hear 
the screams of the women. The impact was sufficiently 
hard to dent the front of the right fender. Defendant's 
wife testified that she heard the impact but not the 
screams of the women and that the defendant immedi-
ately stopped the automobile after the impact. The evi-
dence is conclusive that the child was rolled under the 
automobile a distance of seventy-five feet or more after 
the impact and before the automobile stopped. The testi-
mony of both the defendant and his wife is incredible. 
If the defendant had been looking he must have seen, 
and, as set forth. above, is charged with having seen the 
child. Almost immediately before the impact the child 
was seen sitting on the edge of the lawn seven or eight 
feet east of the east edge of the hard surfaced portion of 
the highway. The. impact occurred approximately three 
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feet west of the east edge of the hard surfaced portion 
of the highway. Therefore, in clear view of the defendant 
was the child carrying a bucket of sand. He traveled a 
distance of ten or eleven feet before he was struck by 
the front of the car. Certainly the child could not have 
been moving more than two or three miles an hour. The 
defendant, traveling ten miles an hour, must have cov-
ered between thirty-three and fifty-five feet during the 
ti1ne that the child traveled fro1n the edge of the grass to 
the point of the i1npact. One driving an automobile at 
ten miles an hour can stop the same in a distance of fif-
teen feet. The average reaction time is three-fourths of 
a second. Defendants would have travelled approxi-
mately eleven feet during that time. An automobile 
travelling ten miles an hour can be stopped in four or 
five feet after the brakes are applied. The total reaction 
and stopping distance would be approximately fifteen 
feet. At the time the child started across the highway, 
because of his age and inability to appreciate any dan-
ger, the child was helpless so far as taking care of itself. 
At that time it was too late for the mother to have done 
anything if she had been watching the child. The defend-
ant had a clear opportunity to have avoided the collision. 
This Court has discussed on several occasions the 
law of last clear chance and has stated its adherence to 
the rules of last clear chance as stated in R.esta tement of 
the Law of Torts, Sec. 479 and 480. S.ee Compton vs. 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 235 Pac. (2d) 
515, ______ Utah ...... . 
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The law as stated in Section 479 is to the effect that 
a negligent defendant who saw or should have seen a 
helpless plaintiff in time to avoid injuring him is liable 
to the plaintiff. The rule as announced in Section 480 is 
to the effect that a negligent defendant is liable to a 
plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance, 
could have observed the danger created by the defend-
ant's negligence in time to have avoided harn1, provided 
the defendant knew of the plaintiff's situation and real-
ized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inat-
tentive and, therefore, is unlikely to discover his peril in 
time to avoid the harm. The difference between the two 
sections is that if the plaintiff is helpless the defendant 
is liable if he knew or should have known of the situation 
of the plaintiff. In Section 480 ·the rule is stated that if 
the plaintiff is not helpless but inattentive, the defendant 
is liable only if he knew and realized or had reason to 
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive. 
The child, being only two years of age, was not 
capable of being negligent and was, because of his age, 
helpless to prevent the accident. Therefore, the rule an-
nounced in S·ection 4 79 should be operative even if we 
assume that the defendant did not see the child. He was 
under a duty to see the child in plenty of time to have 
avoided the accident. Under the doctrine of last clear 
chance, he was plainly liable. The following cases are in 
point on this Inatter: Mingus vs. Ollsen, 201 Pac. (2d) 
495, 114 Utah 505; Leinbach vs. Pickwick-Greyhound 
Lines, 23 Pac. (2d) 449, 138 Kan. 56; Graham vs. John-
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son, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 109 Utah 346; Compton vs. Ogd~en 
Union Railway and D·epot, 235 Pac. (2d) 515, ------ Utah 
...... ; Hyde vs. Union Pacific Railway Compa.ny, 26 Pae. 
979, 7 Utah 356. 
POINT FOUR 
THE NEGLIGEN·CE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS THE 
SOLE, PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE 
CHILD. 
The appellant relies upon the case of Barker vs. 
Savas as discussed herein before upon this proposition. 
There are other cases which reach the same conclu-
sion under similar circumstances. 
In the case of Hornbuckle vs. McCarty, 243 S. W. 
327, 295 Mo. 162, the Court held that, if as the evidence 
tended to show, the driver of the truck in the exercise of 
ordinary care would have discovered the boy's perilous 
position and his obliviousness of such peril in time, by 
the exercise of ordinary diligence to have avoided the 
collision, the driver's negligence, and not the boy's walk-
ing (or running) against the machine, was the juridical 
cause of the latter's death. 
In the same case the Court held that if the driver of 
an automobile could, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
have discovered the peril of one crossing the street in 
such a manner as to be likely to come in contact with the 
vehicle and who was oblivious of his danger in time to 
have avoided the collision, his negligence in failing to do 
so, and not that of the pedestrian in walking into the side 
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of the vehicle, w~s held to be the proximate cause of the 
InJury. 
As the Court said in Chunn vs. City and Suburban 
Railroad, 207 U.S. 302, 52 L.Ed. 219: 
"Nor it it clear that even if the plaintiff was 
not free from fault her negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. If she carelessly placed 
herself in a position exposed to danger and it was 
discovered by the defendant in time to have 
avoided the injury by the use of reasonable care 
on its part and the defendant failed to use such 
care that failure might be found to be the sole 
cause of the resulting injury." 
POINT FIVE 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED THEREON, AND SAID VERDICT AND JUDG-
MENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
F·or this point, the appellant relies upon the argu-
ments hereinbefore made. Summarizing those arguments, 
the appellant contends that he has established that the 
defendant was negligent; the child was incapable of 
negligence; the plain tiff was not guilty of contributory 
negligence as instructed by the Court ; the mother of the 
deceased was not . negligent and if she were, such negli-
gence was immaterial; the defendant had the last clear 
chance to avoid the accident; and the negligence of the 
defendant was the sole, proximate cause of the accident. 
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The appellant submits that in view of the foregoing 
the trial Court should have granted a new trial and hav-
ing failed to do so, the appellant is entitled to a reversal 
of the judgment and a new trial of this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Pla,intiff and 
App~ellant. 
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